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T.: Pleading and Practice--Service of Process--Venue and Jurisdiction
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
PLEADnG AND PRACTICE-SERVICE OF PROCESS-VMNME AND
JuRisDmTIo.-P sued a corporate and a natural defendant in

Nicholas County for injuries growing out of an automobile accident. The summons was directed to the sheriff of Nicholas County,
where the cause of action arose, dated March 8, 1938, and returnable to the first Monday in March, 1938, this being the day before
the summons was issued. Subsequently another summons, labelled
an "alias" summons, was issued against the codefendants returnable to April Rules, and was served only on the natural defendant
in Harrison County. In this original action judgment was rendered
against the codefendants, and the execution being returned unexecuted, this present motion for judgment was started against D
insurance company to enforce the judgment on the basis of a public
liability insurance policy under which the company agreed to pay
whatever sum the insured became obligated to pay, the policy by
express terms including the natural defendant. The insurance
company defended on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction
to render such judgment in the first action because of the invalidity
of the process and therefore the judgment should be declared void.
Held, one judge dissenting, that the invalidity of the first process
did not affect the second; that, since the first was a nullity, the
second may be treated as an original; and that the judgment against
the natural defendant is valid. Hall v. Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp."
Service of process being essential to the jurisdiction of a
court, unless waived, 2 the corporate defendant, not having been
served with process, since the original process was void, cannot be
bound by the judgment.
Process which is returnable to a day which under the law
cannot be a return day, or to an impossible return day, is no summons at all and of no effect. The original summons was,'therefore,
clearly void. An "alias" process, having been issued, might have
cured the original, but where the original is void on its face, there
is no suit pending on which to issue an "alias". 4 The question
now presents itself as to whether an "alias", labelled as such, must
19 S. E. (2d) 45 (W. Va. 1940).
2 McCoy's Ex'r v. McCoy's Devisees, 9 W. Va. 443 (1876); White v. White,

66 W. Va. 79, 66 S. E. 2 (1909) ; Smith Ins. Agency v. Hamilton Fire Ins. Co.,
69 W. Va. 129, 71 S. E. 194 (1911).
3 Coda v. Thompson, 39 W. Va. 67, 19 S. E. 548 (1894) ; Lebow v. Macomber
& Whyte Rope Co., 81 W. Va. 21, 93 S. E. 939 (1917); Xyles v. Ford, 2 Road.
1 (Va. 1823).
4Gorman v. Steed, 1 W. Va. 1 (1864); United States Oil & Gas Well Supply Co. v. Gartlan, 58 W. Va. 267, 52 S. E. 524 (1905).
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be accepted and stand or fall solely as an "alias", or may stand
as an "original". There are cases holding that the mere fact t!"%
the writ is designated as an "alias" cannot affect the essential
character of the writ or render, it less effective as a process to bring
the defendant before the court,5 and an "alias" process which
cannot be held good as an "alias" should be held good as an "original,. 6
If the "alias" is held good as an original, a further problem
of venue and service of this "original" is presented. Under section
one of the general venue statute,7 actions at law may -be brought
in the circuit court of any county wherein any one of the defendants
resides, and the second section of this statute provides that actions
may be brought in any county wherein the cause of action or any
part thereof arose, although none of the defendants reside therein
if one of the defendants is served therein, or one of the parties is
a corporate defendant. If process, therefore, had been issued under
the first section of the venue statute, the process would ordinarily
have been directed to the sheriff of that county, but the West Virginia Code specifically provides that such process may be issued
to the sheriff of any county." The defendant, however, bases its
argument against the legality of the process in question and the
service thereof on the assumption that the natural defendant was
a resident of Harrison County and the only ground for the cause
of action being brought in Nicholas County was the fact that the
5Davis v. McCall, 133 Va. 487, 113 S. E. 835 (1922) holding the fact that
the writ is designated as an "4alias" or as an "original"
cannot affect its
essential character or render it less effective as a process for bringing the defendant before the court. Accord: Mintz v. Frink, 217 N. C. 101, 6 S. E.
(2d) 804 (1940).
6Dunaway v. Lord, 114 W. Va. 671, 173 S. E. 568 (1934) ; Fulbright v. Tritt,
19 N. C. 491 (1837) in which case a statute similar to the West Virginia statute
was construed; Danville & Western R. R. v. Brown, 90 Va. 340, 18 S. E. 278
(1893) where Virginia followed the same rule in applying the prototype of our
own statute; Frantz v. Detroit United Ry., 147 Mich. 199, 110 N. W. 531 (1907).
7W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) e. 56, art. 1, § 1: "Any action or other proceeding at law or suit in equity, except where it is otherwise specially provided,
may hereafter be brought in the circuit court of any county:
(a) Wherein any of the defendants may reside .... "
8W. VA.CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 56, art. 1, § 2: "IAn action, suit or proceeding may be brought in any county wherein the cause of action, or any part
thereof, arose, although none of the defendants reside therein, in the following
instances:
" (a) When the defendant, or if more than one defendant, one or more of
the defendants, is a corporation;
" (b) When the defendant, or if more than one defendant, one or more of
the defendants, are served in such county with process or notice commencing
such action, suit or proceeding."
9W. VA. CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 56, art. 3, § 5: " Process from any court,
whether original, mesne or final, may be directed to the sheriff of any county..."-
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cause of action arose there. There being a corporate defendant,
the case falls within the'second section of the venue statute, and the
process did not have to be served on the natural defendalat in the
county in which the action was brought.10 Though there had been
no corporate defendant, there is nothing on the face of the declaration or in the writ to show that the defendant did not reside in
Nicholas County; and where the declaration and writ are silent as
to the residence of the defendant, and there is nothing to show
improper matter for a court of general jurisdiction, we cannot
assume that the action has been improperly brought.11 Since there
was nothing to show the want of jurisdiction of the court either
on the face of the declaration or in the writ, the motion of the
defendant to quash was properly overruled, and the proper way to
have attacked it would have been to have appeared specially and
pleaded the defect in abatement.12 The defendant, not having so
appeared and pleaded, is presumed to have waived any defects,
and the judgment rendered against the natural defendant is valid
under either section of the venue article.
E. E. T., JR.
PRACTIC

AND PRocEDuRE-AL As PROCESS-W xN IT

MUST

IssuE.-A summons was issued in August, returnable to September Rules, and was returned unexecuted. An alias summons was
then issued, returnable to October Rules, which was also returned
unexecuted. On the first day of November Rules, two pluries
summonses were issued, one returnable that day and the other
returnable at December Rules, the latter pluries summons returned
executed. The certified question from the circuit court was whether
10 There was no inhibition under the old statute, where suit was brought in
the county in which a defendant resided, against sending the process to another
county and serving it on the defendant there, and under the present statute it Is
expressly authorized; and it seems that it should not be different under the
statute which presumably this action was brought, and the presumption in
favor of the jurisdiction of a court of general jurisdiction should work in both
instances.
11 Empire Coal & Coke Co. v. Hull Coal & Coke Co., 51 W. Va. 474, 41 S. E.
917 (1902); W. VA.COD. (Michie, 1937) c. 56, art. 4, § 31.
12 Wilson v. Ritz, 96 W. Va. 397, 400, 123 S. E. 63 (1924): "The bill clearly
'shows on its face proper matter for the jurisdiction of the court;2 therefore,
no exception for want of such jurisdiction could be taken except by plea in
abatement."
Morgan v. Pennsylvania R. R., 148 Va. 278, 138 S. E. 566 (1927); Seaboard
Air Line By. v. J.E. Bowden & Co., 144 Va. 154, 131 S. E. 245 (1926); Gunnoe
v. W. Va. Poultry Ass2n, 115 W. Va. 87, 174 S. E. 691 (1934); Empire Coal &
Coke Co. v. Hull Coal & Coke Co., 51 W. Va. 474, 41 S. E. 917 (1902); W. VA.
CODE (Michie, 1937) c. 56, art. 4, § 31.
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